

STATE OF NEW MEXICO  
COUNTY OF SANTA FE  
**FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT**

STATE OF NEW MEXICO,

PLAINTIFF,

VS.

ALEXANDER RAE BALDWIN III,

DEFENDANT.

No. D-0101-CR-2024-0013  
Judge Mary Marlowe Sommer

**DEFENDANT ALEC BALDWIN'S RESPONSE TO THE STATE'S MOTION *IN LIMINE* 6  
TO EXCLUDE REFERENCES TO PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT**

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Defendant Alec Baldwin, by and through his attorneys, submits this response to the State’s motion *in limine* number 6 to preclude defense counsel from referencing prosecutorial misconduct during this case at trial.<sup>1</sup>

#### ARGUMENT

At last week’s *Trombetta* hearing, Special Prosecutor Johnson argued that Baldwin’s *Trombetta* motion should be denied because Baldwin has “other reasonable available means to get to making their point” about the State’s reliance on improper expert disclosures to bolster unreliable expert testimony and downplay the consequences of the State’s mishandling of evidence—*i.e.*, a trial. Ex. A (6/24/24 H’rg Tr. at 136:23-137:3. (“Defense counsel effectively used this information in cross-examining just in this motion hearing alone. It looked like he was doing it for a trial, but that right there demonstrated that they have other reasonable available means to get to making their point.”). Yet the very same day, the State filed this motion, which seeks to preclude, among other things, “allegations of misconduct and constitutional violations which they have lodged against the State during pretrial litigation,” which was a significant part of the cross-examination that Johnson was referring to. Mot. 1. The State can’t have it both ways.

Baldwin has no intentions of making gratuitous *ad hominem* attacks on the State. But if evidence or testimony shows that the State mishandled evidence or engaged with certain witnesses in a manner that impacts their credibility, the jury is entitled to consider those facts when evaluating the quality of the State’s evidence and investigation, the credibility of the State’s factual positions, and the merit of the State’s case. *See, e.g., State v. Hester*, 1999-NMSC-020, ¶ 17, 979 P.2d 729 (“Defense counsel extensively cross-examined the State’s witnesses to show gaps in the

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<sup>1</sup> To the extent the State’s motion *in limine* number 6 intends to exclude evidence that is more fully described in its motion *in limine* number 3, which appears to be partially duplicative of this motion, Baldwin incorporates his response to State’s motion number 3 here.

police investigation and to thereby suggest reasonable doubt.”); *Smith v. Sec’y of New Mexico Dep’t of Corr.*, 50 F.3d 801, 830 (10th Cir. 1995) (recognizing that “the knowledge the police were investigating [a witness for the prosecution as an alternate suspect] would arguably carry significant weight with the jury in and of itself” and “would also have been useful in “discredit[ing] the caliber of the investigation or the decision to charge the defendant”).<sup>2</sup> Further, the defense is entitled to vigorously cross-examine law enforcement witnesses, and evidence of their bias and motives is always relevant. *See, e.g., United States v. Abel*, 469 U.S. 45, 51 (1984); *Davis v. Alaska*, 415 U.S. 308, 317–18 (1974).

To support its staggering claim that Baldwin is not entitled to introduce evidence related to the quality of the law enforcement investigation, the State cites a single, unpublished, out-of-state, federal case, *United States v. Allerheiligen*, 1998 WL 918841 (D. Kan. Nov. 19, 1998), which held that “evidence *solely* related to those legal issues previously decided by the court” in a suppression order would not be allowed at trial. *Id.* At \*4 (emphasis added). The case is distinguishable. While evidence “solely” related to issues already decided by the Court might be inadmissible at trial, evidence of the State’s mishandling of evidence, bias, and other similar

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<sup>2</sup> *See also, e.g., Kyles v. Whitley*, 514 U.S. 419, 445 (1995) (noting that the “thoroughness and even the good faith of the investigation” were proper subjects of inquiry at trial); *State v. Patterson*, 2017-NMCA-045, ¶ 18, 395 P.3d 543 (holding that jury’s perception of law enforcement agent’s credibility was critical to a criminal defendant’s ultimate conviction and exclusion of inquiry into truthfulness of undercover agent’s police report based on relevance was in error and not harmless, requiring reversal of conviction); *United States v. Cota-Meza*, 367 F.3d 1218, 1223 (10th Cir. 2004) (affirming jury instructions because they “specifically note[d] that the jury can consider the manner in which the investigation was conducted for the purposes of evaluating the weight of the evidence produced by the government and the credibility of the testimony of the law enforcement personnel involved in the investigation.”); *United States v. Freeman*, 816 F.2d 558, 563 (10th Cir. 1987) (admitting statements of law enforcement officer outlining the background of the government investigation of criminal defendant); *United States v. Stanfield*, 521 F.2d 1122, 1128–29 (9th Cir. 1975) (remanding for new trial because district court limited cross-examination of police officers who had questionable credibility).

conduct is not “solely” related to issues under *Brady*, *Trombetta*, and *Youngblood*. It is also probative, relevant, and clearly admissible under settled law to show the weight and credibility of the State’s evidence. *See Hester*, 1999-NMSC-020, ¶ 17, *Smith*, 50 F.3d at 830. The State fails to cite a single case to the contrary. In fact, as noted above, the State admitted at the *Trombetta* hearing that everything Baldwin’s counsel did at that hearing, which included challenging the quality of the State’s investigation and disclosures, among other problematic issues, was fair game for trial. *See Ex. A (6/24/24 H’rg Tr. at 136:23-137:3* (“Defense counsel effectively used this information in cross-examining just in this motion hearing alone. It looked like he was doing it for a trial, but that right there demonstrated that they have other reasonable available means to get to making their point.”).

The Court should deny the State’s motion.

Date: July 1, 2024

Respectfully submitted,

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**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that on July 1, 2024, a true and correct copy of the foregoing brief was emailed to opposing counsel.

*/s/ Heather LeBlanc* \_\_\_\_\_  
Heather LeBlanc

# **EXHIBIT A**



## **Transcript of Remote Proceedings**

**Date:** June 24, 2024

**Case:** State of New Mexico v. Alec Rae Baldwin, III  
**Case Number:** D-0101-CR-2024-0013

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1 conform to certain chemical specifications.  
2 During the building of these legs, they  
3 received FAA quality reliability officer certificates  
4 that said they conform. But then unfortunately,  
5 subsequently to their construction of these radio  
6 towers, the -- one of them basically did not -- it  
7 malfunctioned, essentially broke.  
8 And so Mr. Bohl and his business partner  
9 get charged in federal court, and they basically tell  
10 the government through their counsel, please preserve  
11 these tower legs. We have this certificate from the  
12 FAA quality reliability officers who certified that  
13 these tower legs conformed to chemical  
14 specifications.  
15 The government, on the other hand, had  
16 testing that they had initially sent off to the  
17 University of Maine, or part of the tower leg they  
18 sent off to the University of Maine to have it  
19 tested. That test showed that they did not conform  
20 to the chemical specifications.  
21 So in this particular test -- or in this  
22 particular case, the US 10th Circuit Court of Appeals  
23 found and actually held that the defense didn't meet  
24 Trombetta, they didn't meet, and the analysis in that  
25 case was under Arizona versus Youngblood, despite the

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1 for fingerprints and they photographed it. But then  
2 they subsequently destroyed it.  
3 Mr. Martinez filed a motion to dismiss  
4 under Trombetta. The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals  
5 affirmed the district court's denial of the Trombetta  
6 motion and noted that the defense was merely arguing.  
7 So what the defense was arguing was the manilla  
8 envelope could have been exculpatory, the mailing  
9 label could have obtained, could have been processed  
10 for DNA for saliva on the mailing label to determine  
11 it was not Mr. Martinez, and, in fact, they argued  
12 that there was no evidence that these items that were  
13 destroyed were even explosive devices.  
14 The 10th Circuit noted that other than  
15 conjecture and speculation, not independent objective  
16 evidence, the defense had not demonstrated that these  
17 items before they were destroyed were apparently  
18 exculpatory to law enforcement. Again, what we have  
19 here.  
20 But then you also have to look at the  
21 second prong of the Trombetta test and that is does  
22 the defense have other available comparable evidence  
23 that they could use in this issue? That is addressed  
24 by United States versus Ludwig, which is 641F.3d  
25 1243, also a 10th Circuit Court of Appeals decision.

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1 fact that the defense had independent objective  
2 evidence.  
3 And the reason the State brings that to  
4 the Court's attention is because at Page 911 of that  
5 opinion it says, "Second, Bell and Bohl's assertion"  
6 -- and I'm quoting directly from the opinion.  
7 "Second, Bell and Bohl's assertion that  
8 the tower legs possess potentially exculpatory value  
9 was not merely conclusory but instead was backed up  
10 with objective independent evidence giving the  
11 government reason to believe that further tests on  
12 the leg might lead to exculpatory evidence."  
13 We don't have that in that case,  
14 Your Honor. And that was also noted, that kind of  
15 language was noted in the US 10th Circuit Court of  
16 Appeals opinion in United States versus Martinez,  
17 744F.2d 76. And in that case, the defendant was  
18 charged with possession and making explosives.  
19 Law enforcement seized a package, they  
20 essentially removed the blasting cap from the device,  
21 they opened the wrapper, and then they took the  
22 material, they burned it, and they buried it. They  
23 also transported other materials, such as a manilla  
24 envelope that contained a mailing label, but,  
25 unfortunately -- well, they actually processed that

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1 And in Ludwig, the law enforcement  
2 officer conducted a traffic stop, they lost or  
3 destroyed the video that documented this traffic stop  
4 and the defense filed a motion to dismiss under  
5 Trombetta. The 10th Circuit noted that Ludwig did  
6 have other comparable evidence that could be obtained  
7 by other reasonable means and that Page 12- -- 1254  
8 of that opinion, the 10th Circuit notes, "We rejected  
9 defendant's Trombetta claim reasoning that the  
10 defendant could have called witnesses to the event to  
11 adduce what the missing videotaped evidence showed."  
12 They have that in this case. You have  
13 the officers who seized this gun, you have  
14 Mr. Ziegler who conducted the accidental discharge  
15 test, you have Mr. Haag, Luke Haag, Mike Haag, who  
16 can testify about their analysis and examination.  
17 The parts are still available.  
18 The fact that this gun was unfortunately  
19 damaged during the accidental discharge testing does  
20 not deprive the defendant of the evidence that they  
21 could use effectively in cross-examining and we saw  
22 that.  
23 Defense counsel effectively used this  
24 information in cross-examining just in this motion  
25 hearing alone. It looked like he was doing it for a



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1 trial, but that right there demonstrated that they  
2 have other reasonable available means to get to  
3 making their point.  
4 So they fail under Trombetta.  
5 So then we go in to Arizona versus  
6 Youngblood. Under Arizona versus Youngblood, the  
7 US Supreme Court added a third test that in order for  
8 the defense to demonstrate a due process violation,  
9 they have to show that the evidence -- excuse me --  
10 that the law enforcement acted in bad faith.  
11 And at Page 57 from the Youngblood  
12 decision, 488 US Page 57, it says that basically when  
13 you deal with failure to preserve and I quote,  
14 "evidentiary material of which no more can be said,  
15 then it could have been subjected to tests, the  
16 results which might have exonerated the defendant,  
17 the Court has to look at the third prong and that is  
18 that there was bad faith on the part of the law  
19 enforcement."  
20 And that bad faith element actually  
21 dovetails with Trombetta's first element, which talks  
22 about what essentially law enforcement was aware of.  
23 So you have to look at what was law  
24 enforcement aware of in this case. And, Your Honor,  
25 a dispassionate review of the evidence in this case

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1 something wrong with this gun. So there was no way  
2 for law enforcement to be put on notice that there  
3 could be anything wrong with this firearm.  
4 And the United States versus Bohl  
5 decision, Your Honor, was actually a good decision  
6 for this Court to look at because in that case, what  
7 you had, and the Court did find a due process  
8 violation under Youngblood. They didn't find it  
9 under Trombetta because they, as I mentioned earlier,  
10 the defense did not demonstrate that it was  
11 immediately apparent at the time.  
12 But under Youngblood, they did find bad  
13 faith, and the reason they found bad faith in Bohl is  
14 because, number one, the defendants had this  
15 certificate from the FAA quality assurance officers  
16 that indicated these tower legs conform to chemical  
17 specifications. And then they asked the government  
18 when the government seized the tower legs to please  
19 preserve the legs. They begged the government to  
20 allow them to conduct testing on these legs, and  
21 despite getting these numerous requests, the  
22 government destroyed the tower legs.  
23 The Court in Bohl did find that that is  
24 bad faith because they knew not only that they had  
25 the FAA certificate, they also were put on notice by

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1 leads one to conclude that the exculpatory value of  
2 this firearm in the condition it was in on  
3 October 21st, 2021, is extremely low.  
4 First, Mr. Baldwin himself told OSHA  
5 investigators that the gun had no mechanical defects.  
6 In fact, he was asked specifically -- Corporal  
7 Hancock testified to that, he was asked, "Was there  
8 anything mechanically wrong with the gun?"  
9 He said, "No. There was nothing wrong.  
10 I'd been using it for days. The only problem was  
11 that it was -- there was live bullet in the gun."  
12 Those were his words.  
13 That could not put law enforcement on  
14 notice that this gun had, if you believe their  
15 theory, some potential mechanical defects.  
16 When he was interviewed by law  
17 enforcement on October 21st, 2021, he never said, "I  
18 didn't pull the trigger" to the officers. He said,  
19 "The gun went off."  
20 Well, saying the gun went off is not the  
21 equivalent of saying there was something wrong with  
22 this gun. People say the gun went off because nobody  
23 was expecting that a live bullet would be in there,  
24 it's unknown. But what we know is that when somebody  
25 says the gun went off does not equate to there's

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1 the defendants, hey, these tower legs conform to  
2 specifications. Nevertheless the government  
3 destroyed them.  
4 That's not what we have here. What we  
5 have here is a gun that everybody who handles this  
6 gun was in perfect working order from the man who  
7 manufactured -- manufactured this gun, Mr. Pietta, to  
8 the person who received it after him, to the person  
9 who bought it from EMF, to law enforcement, to  
10 Mr. Ziegler, and all the way down to the Haags.  
11 I want to briefly just address this red  
12 herring that the defense raised about Mr. Haag's  
13 August 31st, 2023, report.  
14 First of all, Your Honor, there is no  
15 intentional wrongdoing here. Ms. Morrissey has  
16 accepted it was an oversight. She forgot to e-mail  
17 it. But, anyway, that's I'm sure the subject of yet  
18 another motion that's been filed before the Court,  
19 but what's important there is that Mr. Haag in that  
20 report did not say there were modifications to this  
21 gun. What he said, there were "irregular off axis  
22 diagonal tool marks of an unknown origin. It seems  
23 unlikely, although it cannot be excluded that these  
24 tool marks were made by the FBI's testing."  
25 So he doesn't say the FBI testing didn't

